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The single photon detection efficiency of the detector unit is crucial for the security of common
quantum key distribution protocols like Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84). A low value for the efficiency
indicates a possible eavesdropping attack that exploits the photon receiver’s imperfections. We
present a method for estimating the detection efficiency, and calculate the corresponding secure
key generation rate. The estimation is done by testing gated detectors using a randomly activated
photon source inside the receiver unit. This estimate gives a secure rate for any detector with non-
unity single photon detection efficiency, both inherit or due to blinding. By adding extra optical
components to the receiver, we make sure that the key is extracted from photon states for which
our estimate is valid. The result is a quantum key distribution scheme that is secure against any
attack that exploits detector imperfections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a method
to distribute a secret key between two separate parties,
commonly named Alice and Bob. In a QKD scheme Al-
ice and Bob share a quantum channel to distribute the
key, as well as an authenticated classical channel for post
processing. They also need a source to create a quantum
signal, and a detector. An eavesdropper Eve is allowed
full control over the quantum channel and may listen to
the classical channel. Under these conditions, and under
the assumption that Alice and Bob’s equipment is flaw-
less, QKD has been proven unconditionally secure [3, 4].
In the real world equipment is imperfect. Security has
been proved for certain general and specific imperfec-
tions [5–7]. However, for several different imperfections,
attacks against QKD systems have been proposed [8–
21]. Most of these studies experimentally demonstrated
imperfection of a system component or subsystem that
would allow an attack, but a couple experiments demon-
strated successful eavesdropping of the key in a running
system [14, 16]. Many realistic attacks, including the lat-
ter two, take advantage of imperfections in the detectors
[8–10, 12–14, 16, 17, 21–25]. A secure setup requires Bob
to measure the signal in a randomly chosen basis. Any
differences in detection probability between the bases, in
any domain (time, frequency, modes), can be exploited
by Eve [26, 27]. Such differences may either be inherent
in the system itself or be forced upon the system by Eve,
for example by blinding one of the detectors [12, 14].
Several solutions have been proposed to the problems
caused by imperfect detectors. One option is to use a
security proof which is valid for uncharacterized detec-
tors [28]; however, then a positive QKD rate requires
unrealistically high detection efficiency in the system. A
promising approach is the so-called measurement device
independent QKD [29], where a secure key is generated
even with untrusted detectors, at the expense of a some-
what more complicated system [30, 31]. Another, more
direct approach, is to find countermeasures for each at-
tack [32–34]. While convenient and practical, one can-
not necessarily be sure that the countermeasures close
all types of attacks, or just the already known attacks
[35–37]. Also, the countermeasure itself often requires
new components or modified setups, which in turn may
open new loopholes.
In this article we will suggest an approach that secures
the detector against all attacks as long as some reason-
able assumptions are satisfied. This will be done by us-
ing the security proof in Ref. 38, where Bob’s part of the
system is characterized by a parameter η, which corre-
sponds to the minimum probability that a non-vacuum
signal incident to Bob is actually detected by him. Us-
ing an additional photon source, we can estimate η, and
quantify the trustworthiness of the detectors. To make
sure the assumptions for our proof are satisfied we make
some modifications to Bob’s part of the system and use
bit-mapped gating [39]. A secure key rate can then by
calculated. Qualitatively, it can be said that the bit-
mapped gating and the modifications to Bob takes care
of detector efficiency mismatch type loopholes; our ad-
ditional photon source takes care of attacks exploiting
low single photon detection efficiency, like the blinding
attack.
For simplicity we consider the special case of infinite
key length (known as the asymptotic limit). Similarly
to the so-called device-independent QKD scenario, we
assume that no information leaks out of Alice’s and Bob’s
devices [40]. However the result may be combined with
imperfections in the source, and with information leakage
from the detectors, both as done in Ref. 38, and with
decoy states [41–43].
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FIG. 1. Alice and Bob’s system for BB84 quantum key dis-
tribution.
II. SETUP AND SECURITY PROOF
We will consider the Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) [1]
protocol using a fiber-based setup with phase coding [44]
and gated detectors. However the ideas presented may
also be adapted to free space QKD [45], and to other
encoding protocols. In phase-based QKD, the key is en-
coded into the phase difference between the two parts
of a light pulse. Figure 1 shows a typical phase-based
QKD system. The pulse is created at Alice’s side. Using
an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer she splits it,
and encodes her choice of bit and basis by introducing a
relative phase shift between the two halves. Bob’s part
of the system, hereafter referred to as Bob, consists of a
similar interferometer and two single photon detectors.
Alice and Bob choose one of two bases for each pulse
and each detection. These two bases are usually referred
to as the z basis and x basis. In a practical setup, the
pulses live in a large Hilbert space consisting of several
Fock spaces, and the z and x bases do not correspond to
the usual z and x bases in two-dimensional Hilbert space.
They are just names for the two (possibly misaligned)
bases which Alice and Bob specify. The key is created
from the n pulses where the same basis is chosen by both
Alice and Bob, and detection time corresponds to the
pulse traveling the short arm of one interferometer and
the long arm of the other. For these pulses interference
between the two possible paths allows the bit value sent
by Alice to be obtained by observing in which of the
detectors the pulse arrives.
The choice of which basis to assign to each letter, x
and z, is arbitrary. In fact Alice and Bob may randomize
this assignment for each pulse, creating a protocol that
is symmetric between the bases. The system’s average
yield q¯, which is the fraction of pulses that are detected
by Bob, and δ¯, the average error rate for those pulses,
are then both equal in the two bases [46]. The secure key
generation rate extracted from nq¯ bits received by Bob
is given by [6]
R = 1− h(δ¯)− H
nq¯
(1)
in the asymptotic limit. The function h(·) is the binary
Shannon entropy, and H is the amount of privacy ampli-
fication needed to remove Eve’s knowledge of the key. If
η is constant during the transmission, we have [38]
H = n(q¯ − ηq¯(1− h(δ¯))). (2)
Here, for simplicity, we have assumed that the source is
perfect; the case with imperfections in the source can
easily be covered by a small modification to (2) [38].
To find a valid numerical expression for the key gener-
ation rate, η needs to be lower bounded. The parameter
η is, as in Ref. 38, interpreted as the minimum probabil-
ity that a non-vacuum incident to the basis dependent
interferometer in Bob is detected. Thus η is a parame-
ter explicitly given by the state of Bob’s system, while
the yield q is dependent on both Bob’s system and the
incoming pulse. In a real QKD experiment the state of
Bob’s system might change during key exchange. For
example, the characteristics of the detectors may change
as a result of bright illumination from Eve, as in the
blinding attacks [12]. We will therefore consider η a vari-
able parameter depending on the state of Bob’s system.
Before each individual qubit measurement the system is
characterized by the parameter ηi, which is the minimum
probability that a non-vacuum signal is detected by Bob.
The index i labels the different possible characteristics of
Bob’s system and pi is the probability that the system is
in the state i. Note that ηi is independent of Bob’s basis
choice, it is the minimum over any possible configuration
of Bob’s system.
Since Eve may want to tune the yield q and error prob-
ability δ, to correlate them with ηi, we need to index them
by i as well. We note that Eve may control ηi, qi, and δi.
In the same way as δ¯ is the average error probability for
those signals that are detected by Bob, we define η¯ as the
average value of η for those same detected signals. This
is also in accordance with the security analyses in Refs. 6
and 38.[47] According to these definitions the parameters
are subject to the relations:
∑
i
pi = 1, (3a)∑
i
piqi = q¯, (3b)∑
i
piqiηi = q¯η¯, (3c)∑
i
piqiδi = q¯δ¯. (3d)
Using random sampling to estimate δ¯, error correction
can still be done by sacrificing h(δ¯) bits. The quantity
H in (1) is now bounded by
H ≤ max
pi,ηi,qi,qi,δi
∑
i
(npiqi − npiηiqi(1− h(δi))) (4)
= nq¯ − nη¯q¯ + max
pi,ηi,qi,δi
n
∑
i
piηiqih(δi).
Using the concavity of the binary entropy, we have, for
3any q¯, η¯ and δ¯ ≤ η¯/2:∑
i
piqiηih(δi) ≤ q¯η¯
∑
i
piqiηi
q¯η¯
h(δi) (5)
≤ q¯η¯h
(∑
i
piqiδiηi
q¯η¯
)
≤ q¯η¯h
(∑
i
piqiδi
q¯η¯
)
≤ q¯η¯h
(
δ¯
η¯
)
.
We therefore obtain
H ≤ nq¯
(
1− η¯
(
1− h
(
δ¯
η¯
)))
. (6)
The bound (6) is tight as the right hand side is achieved
if Eve controls the system as follows: For np1q1 = nq¯η¯
detected pulses, the system is in some state with η1 = 1
and δ1 = δ¯/η¯. For the remaining nq¯(1 − η¯) detected
pulses the system is in a state with η2 = 0, and δ2 = 0.
The key generation rate is bounded by
R ≥ η¯
(
1− h
(
δ¯
η¯
))
− h(δ¯). (7)
This rate is similar to the main result from Ref. 38,
with the parameter η replaced by its average value and
qx = qz. A main difference is the factor 1/η¯ inside the
binary entropy function, which leads to a reduction of
the rate. This is due to Eve’s ability to avoid introduc-
ing errors when the detectors are in a vulnerable state.
On the other hand, in Ref. 38 η must be interpreted as a
minimum value, which in many cases leads to zero rate.
III. MODIFICATIONS TO BOB
We now turn to find a lower bound for the average min-
imum detection probability η¯. The main idea is to have
a source inside Bob’s setup, to test detector sensitivities
at random times. We will discuss Bob’s parameter η as
a function of frequency (i.e., wavelength of light), time,
or as a function of detailed field distributions. In this
context, η is defined as the minimum detection probabil-
ity of a non-vacuum state with the prescribed frequency,
time, or field distribution.
In general the detection probability depends to some
extent on the incoming photons frequency, polarization
mode, phase and the time of arrival. These parameters
may take infinitely many different values. It is thus un-
feasible to find a lower bound for every state experimen-
tally. Instead we restrict the state space T of the incom-
ing signals by modifying Bob. These modifications will
make sure that any single photon pulse in T will have al-
most the same detection probability. The modifications
are all placed before the interferometer and Bob’s basis
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FIG. 2. Bob’s modified system including a test source.
choice. Any loss due to these components will then only
contribute to a smaller yield q, and not to η. We can now
estimate η¯ from the detection rate qT of test pulses in T .
The test pulses are generated by a source, fired at ran-
domly chosen gates. The pulses are coupled into the fiber
scheme before the interferometer. The modifications are
shown in Fig. 2.
The first element in the modified Bob is an optical
fuse. If Eve tries to send a pulse with higher power than
a certain value P0, this element will be destroyed and
communication on the quantum channel will stop. This
serves a dual purpose. Bounding the power of Eve’s pulse
is helpful in our security analysis. Also, deprived of the
possibility of sending strong pulses, we may assume that
Eve cannot radically change the behavior of the optical
elements in Bob’s system via laser damage [48, 49].
If some of Eve’s pulses are let into Bob when we run
the test pulses, our test results will be disturbed. We
therefore want an element to deflect, extinguish, or at
least dampen Eve’s pulses at these times. In combina-
tion with the optical fuse, this switch or modulator makes
sure that Eve’s pulses consist mainly of vacuum when we
are sending test pulses. The disturbance of the test mea-
surement statistics must be close to negligible. Note that
this switch or modulator should not change the parame-
ters qi and δi in any other pulses from Eve, as this may
give Eve some information about when we are sending
test pulses.
Assumption 1. When we are sending a test pulse, any
pulse from Eve will change the probability of a detection
by at most E .
To allow just a small bandwidth into Bob, we use a
narrowpass filter that transmits light within a frequency
range Ω = [ω0−ωB , ω0 +ωB ], and heavily attenuates all
light outside it. In practice, such filter can be achieved
by a combination of interference- and absorption-based
optical filters. The central frequency of the filter, ω0, is
the same as the central frequency of Alice’s pulse [50].
Assumption 2. For any pulse from Eve with frequencies
outside the range Ω, the probability that at least one
photon is transmitted through the filter and detected is
smaller than qω [51].
The probability qω depends on the filter performance
and the power P0 needed to damage the optical fuse. For
4later use, let ζω be the fraction of detection events that
corresponds to photons outside Ω. Clearly, ζω ≤ qω/q.
For states in Ω we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3. For any frequencies ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω, |η(ω1)−
η(ω2)| ≤ Ω.
When it comes to spatial modes, almost all incoming
waves now have the same frequency. We can then in-
sert a short length of single mode fiber in front of the
interferometer.
Assumption 4. At most nζk of the pulses detected by
Bob have another mode than the mode allowed in the
single mode fiber
The parameter ζk depends on P0 and the length of the
single mode fiber. We make sure that all of this fiber is
inside Bob so Eve cannot easily access it.
Having made sure that virtually all signals entering
Bob have the required frequency and mode, we now con-
sider the timing of the signal. Since Eve controls the
fiber between Alice and Bob, we must assume that she
can control this timing. A gated detection scheme is thus
needed, where the following assumption is satisfied:
Assumption 5. For any times t1, t2 inside the gate,
|η(t1)− η(t2)| ≤ T .
As long as this assumption holds true, we can fire our
test pulse at any time inside a gate. Eve’s advantage by
choosing another part of the gate is limited by T .
If Bob’s system suffers from detector efficiency mis-
match [8], η is not slowly varying at the beginning and
the end of the gate. We would therefore like to discard
pulses which arrive at these times. Due to jitter in the
detector of the same order of magnitude as the detec-
tor gate length [52], it is impossible to recognize these
events after detection. We therefore suggest to employ
the technique of bit-mapped gating [39]. Any signal de-
tected at the beginning and end of the gate will have a
random value and contribute to the error rate δ. At least
a fraction (1−2δ) of the detected signals must then have
passed inside the inner gate, for which Assumption 5 is
valid. Another feature of bit-mapped gating is that the
two detectors are randomly assigned to bit value 0 or 1
for each pulse. Thus our setup is equivalent to a setup
with one detector which measures whether the bit is 0
or 1. We therefore don’t need to measure η for the two
detectors seperately. Finally, we note that the detection
probability drops to zero immediately after a detection.
Although this violates Assumption 5, it does not affect η¯
as we can only have one detection per gate.
We also need to consider the number of photons in
the pulse. We cannot test all possible states, however
for weak pulses detection probability increases with the
number of photons in the pulse. Thus the following as-
sumption is natural:
Assumption 6. The detection probability is smaller for
a single photon than for any multiphoton state.
The pulse arrives at Bob in two parts, the first giving
detection if the photon travels in the long arm of the in-
terferometer and the last giving detection if the photon
travels the short arm. To some extent, η may depend
on the phase, polarization or detailed shape of the two
parts. However, due to assigning each detector to a ran-
dom bit value for each pulse, such dependency should be
small. Let the detailed field, including the polarization,
be described by ψ(t) as a function of time.
Assumption 7. For any two distributions ψ1(t) and
ψ2(t), |ηψ1 − ηψ2 | ≤ I .
IV. KEY GENERATION RATE WITH
ESTIMATION OF η
Because of the modifications to Bob most of the pulses
entering the detectors are now in T . Eve would like as
many pulses as possible outside T since for these pulses
she can construct states for which η = 0, without get-
ting noticed. To get an upper bound on the fraction of
pulses not in T we note that being outside of T in both
frequency and mode dimensions further decreases the de-
tection probability of these pulses. Therefore Eve should
send pulses which is outside T only in the dimension
where the transmission probability is largest. In addi-
tion some of the detected pulses might be outside T in
the time dimension. With probability larger than
1− ζ = 1− 2δ −max{ζω, ζk}, (8)
a detection event originates from a photon with frequency
in Ω, arrival time in the gate, and with the same mode
as the test pulse.
If Bob’s test pulse is a single photon source, the mini-
mum detection probability ηT of a single photon state in
T is bounded by the measured detection probability of
the test pulse, qT :
ηT ≥ qT − E − Ω − T − I = qT − tot. (9)
Here tot = E + Ω + T + I . For states not in T we
have no such bound. A lower bound for the estimated
average minimum detection probability of single photon
states, η¯E , is then
η¯E ≥ (1− ζ)ηT = (1− ζ)(qT − tot). (10)
We now need to take into account that the parameter η¯ in
Eq. (7) is the average value of η for those nq¯ states which
were detected. In the worst case scenario, the remaining
n(1− q¯) non-detected states have η = 1, such that
η¯E = q¯η¯ + (1− q¯). (11)
By combining (7) and (11) the expression for the key
generation rate when using single photons as test pulses
is found to be
R ≥ q¯ + η¯E − 1
q¯
(
1− h
(
q¯δ¯
q¯ + η¯E − 1
))
− h(δ¯). (12)
5FIG. 3. Key generation rate (Eq. (12)) as a function of esti-
mated single photon detection efficiency η¯E for different val-
ues of the yield q¯ and error rate δ¯.
This is our main result, in addition to the correspond-
ing expression when using a faint laser source to produce
the test pulses (Section V B). The main difference from
the rate resulting from (1) and (2) is the dependence on
the detection rate q¯ and estimated detector parameter
η¯E . This is due to the possibility that Eve forces detec-
tions when the detectors are in a vulnerable mode and
no detections when the detectors are safe. Thus the de-
tectors need to be subject to random testing during key
exchange. Any successful attempt from Eve to control
the measurement results, without introducing errors, will
show up as η¯E < 1 during testing. As seen in Fig. 3, as
long as q¯ remains high, positive key rate is still possible
for small η¯E . Key gain is possible for η¯E + q¯ ≥ 1 in an
error-free protocol.
V. KEY GENERATION RATE WITH
PRACTICAL EQUIPMENT
When building Bob as described in Section III some
parts are challenging to implement. In this section we
will consider certain solutions to these challenges.
A. Detectors with low efficiency
Commercially available detectors used in QKD oper-
ate with a detection efficiency substantially less than 1,
with most avalanche photodiodes having detection effi-
ciency in the 0.1 to 0.5 range [52–54]. This leads to
the factor (q¯ + η¯E − 1) being negative and (12) giving
negative key rate. A practical solution to this is to as-
sume that no matter what Eve does, she cannot improve
the single photon detection efficiency beyond some up-
per limit ηmax. This leads to some adjustments in the
rate. In the third step of Inequality (5) we now get an
extra factor ηmax in the argument of the entropy func-
tion, q¯η¯h
(∑
i
piqiδiηi
q¯η¯
)
≤ q¯η¯h
(∑
i
piqiδiηmax
q¯η¯
)
. This fac-
FIG. 4. Key generation rate (Eq. (15)) as a function of esti-
mated single photon detection efficiency, η¯E , in the case where
η¯E , is equal to the expected value ηmax. The rate is plotted
for different error rates δ¯, and is valid for any yield q¯.
tor carries over to Eq. (7) giving
R ≥ η¯
(
1− h
(
δ¯ηmax
η¯
))
− h(δ¯). (13)
Additionally, we must make the following adjustment to
Eq. (11):
η¯E = q¯η¯ + (1− q¯)ηmax, (14)
Combining Eqs (13) and (14) gives a rate
R ≥ ηmax
q¯ + η¯Eηmax − 1
q¯
(
1− h
(
δ¯
q¯
q¯ + η¯Eηmax − 1
))
−h(δ¯).
(15)
Note that the expression (15) simplifies to
R = η¯E(1− h(δ¯))− h(δ¯) (16)
for η¯E = ηmax, i.e. when the detector is working as well
as we expect it to. This is the same rate as one gets if
η is treated as a constant parameter [38]. This rate is
depicted in Fig. 4 for different error rates δ¯. This shows
that a detector with low single photon efficiency is not a
great security risk in itself, but is detrimental to the rate.
A detector which shows a worse single photon efficiency
than expected indicates a possible attack from Eve, and
requires even more privacy amplification.
B. Estimation of η with a faint pulsed laser
While single photons sources are available [54], and
have been used in some QKD experiments [55, 56], using
a faint laser to produce the test pulse provides an easier
setup. For a phase-randomized source with mean photon
number µ, the produced state is
ρB = e
−µ |0〉 〈0|+µe−µ |1〉 〈1|+(1−e−µ−µe−µ)σm, (17)
6FIG. 5. Estimated single photon efficiency ηE as a function
of mean photon number µ of for two different detectors: One
with detection efficiency η = 0.1 and dark count rate 2 · 10−5
(lower line) [57], and one with detection efficiency η = 0.4 and
dark count rate 2 · 10−5 (upper line).
with σm being all states with more than one photon. This
changes the relationship (9) between the detection rate of
the pulses qT and the minimum single photon detection
probability ηT . We now have
qT ≤ e−µd+ µe−µ(ηT + tot) + (1− e−µ − µe−µ), (18)
or
ηT ≥ 1− tot + 1− d
µ
− 1− qT
µe−µ
. (19)
In this case the key generation rates given by (12) and
(15) are still valid, but the limit for η¯E in (10) is replaced
with
η¯E ≥ (1− ζ)
(
1− tot + 1− d
µ
− 1− qT
µe−µ
)
= (1− ζ)
(
qT − d
µ
+ qT − µ
2
− tot
)
+O(µ2) +O(µqT ). (20)
The dark count rate per gate per pair of detectors, d,
can be upper bounded by turning off the test pulse while
stopping Eve’s pulses. As shown in Fig. 5, for a suffi-
ciently small d, we can choose a small µ and obtain a
result which is approximately the same as for a single
photon source. The lower line corresponds to a detector
with η = 0.1, d = 2 · 10−5 as in Ref. 57. The upper line
shows a more sensitive detector with η = 0.4, d = 2·10−5.
For both detectors ζ = tot = 0 is assumed for simplic-
ity; for multiphoton states each photon is assumed to be
detected independently. We see that for both detectors
the method described in the previous subsection, using
an estimate of ηmax, is needed for positive rate. For the
less sensitive detector a very low µ is needed to approach
the true value η = 0.1.
C. Testing without deflecting Alice/Eve
The element used to deflect/destroy Alice’s pulse dur-
ing testing must be able to quickly change between total
transmittance and total absorbance or deflection. Con-
structing or finding such an element is challenging. As an
alternative, testing can be done without deflecting Alice’s
pulse, simply by coupling the test pulse into the line us-
ing a fiber optic coupler. Assumption 1 is then no longer
valid. We can replace it with an assumption bounding
the superlinearity [13] of the detector response.
Assumption 1a. Let q′T be the actual detection proba-
bility under testing. Then q′T ≤ q+qT +S , with qT being
the detection probability if Eve were totally disconnected
and S bounding the superlinearity of the detector.
The key generation rates given by (12) and (15) are
valid in this approach also, with S replacing E and set-
ting qT = q
′
T − q in (9).
The validity of this assumption needs some further dis-
cussion. If a detector is blind for pulses below some
threshold intensity and Eve sends pulses slightly below
this threshold, clearly q′T > q + qT could be possible.
However, as long as the test pulse is weak (µ < 1), the
increase in detection probability by adding a test pulse to
Eve’s pulse should be small, especially since Eve won’t be
able to control the exact number of photons in her pulse
reaching the detector due to losses in Bob. Therefore S
might be considered small.
Security-wise, testing without deflecting Eve is possi-
ble, but for the secure key rate such an approach seems
disastrous. For positive key rate, η¯E + q ≥ 1 is needed.
The value we use for η¯E is the lower bound given by
(10). This bound is smaller than qT . For positive rate
we therefore need q+ qT > 1, but this is impossible if we
use qT = q
′
T − q. Thus either some intensity modulation
of Eve’s pulse must be done during testing, or stricter
assumptions upon the linear response of the detector are
needed.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have proposed a method to estimate the average
detection efficiency parameter η¯. Given this parameter,
QKD is secure for all imperfections in Bob, as long as no
signals are emitted from him. Furthermore, information
leakage from Alice and Bob can be taken into account
by the approach in Ref. 38. In this case, more work
is needed to estimate the relevant parameters describing
leakage. Alternatively, an approach to estimate leakage is
proposed in Refs. 58 and 59. The proof of this approach
is also based on Koashi’s proof [6] which makes reconcil-
ing it with the proof in this article promising. Anyway,
the introduction of new components in Bob must be con-
sidered in the estimation of information leakage.
When estimating η, the parameters in Section III,
ζω, Ω, ζk, T , I , and E , must be determined by Al-
7ice and Bob. If Eve can control these parameters the
assumptions of the security proof are not satisfied. The
parameters ζω, Ω, ζk, I , and E are controlled by the
components in Bob and can be estimated by testing these
components. Their values are small in a proper setup,
and conservative estimates will not affect the key gener-
ation rate considerably. We assume that the conservative
estimates apply unless irreversible and detectable dam-
age is induced by Eve. Thus these parameters do not
need continuous monitoring like η. To keep T small, a
bit-mapped gated detection scheme [39] is necessary and
sufficient.
The rate is strongly dependent on the yield q¯ and esti-
mated avreage detection efficiency η¯E . Realistically, the
yield is less than the detection efficiency, which means
that in practice, η¯E ≥ 1/2 is needed for a positive key
generation rate. The reason for this can be seen from the
attack where Eve controls the system as described before
Equations (7) and (11). In this case the bound for the se-
cret key generation rate (12) is tight. Equality is attained
by an attack where Eve controls both the incoming pulses
and the single photon detection efficiency. In the attack
nq¯(1− η¯) pulses are detected correctly while the detector
is blind to single photons. The remaining nq¯η¯ detected
pulses are detected, with some errors, while the detec-
tors are sensitive to every single photon pulse. The final
n(1− q¯) pulses are vacuum and the detector would have
detected them if they were single photons. This attack
shows why a decent detector with single photon efficiency
η = 0.5 can be considered insecure. If Eve controls η she
can e.g. increase it to unity for half of the pulses and let
the detector be blind to single photons (η = 0) for the
other half. In the instances when the detector is blind
she can send weak pulses as in the blinding attack [12],
and get full knowledge of the key. In this case we would
still measure η¯ = 0.5.
To improve the rate, one needs to verify or assume
that Eve does not control the system as described before
Equations (7) and (11). We describe one such possible
assumption, assuming that Eve cannot increase the single
photon detection efficiency beyond some value ηmax to
fool the estimation procedure. This assumption seems
reasonably safe, given that the setup prevents the use of
laser damage [48, 49]. Under this assumption, as long
as the estimated single photon ηE is close to ηmax, the
key rate before error correction is the same as in QKD
with perfect equipment multiplied by the single photon
detection efficiency. Key gain is therefore clearly possible,
but non-unity single photon detection efficiency is still a
disadvantage with respect to the rate.
Implementation of the modified Bob’s setup is rela-
tively simple in principle. However, it is challenging to
find a sufficiently fast element for deflecting Eve’s pulses
during testing. Without it, a stricter assumption on the
behavior of the detector is needed and the rate suffers.
The single photon source in Bob can be replaced by a
faint laser similar to the one in Alice, as long as Bob’s
dark count rate is sufficiently small.
The setup and method described here can be an im-
portant step towards practical secure QKD. Security is
no stronger than the weakest link. Since QKD is uncon-
ditionally secure with perfect equipment, the implemen-
tation is where Eve has had the best opportunities for
attack. Our method gives secure key generation under
realistic and testable assumptions. Teset
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Ø.M. and J.S. thank the University Graduate Center,
NO-2027 Kjeller, Norway for providing them workplace.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proc. IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal
Processing (Bangalore, India) (IEEE Press, New York,
1984) pp. 175–179.
[2] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[3] D. Mayers, in Proceedings of Crypto’96, Vol. 1109, edited
by N. Koblitz (Springer, New York, 1996) pp. 343–357.
[4] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441
(2000).
[5] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill,
Quantum Inf. Comput. 4, 325 (2004).
[6] M. Koashi, New J. Phys. 11, 045018 (2009).
[7] H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and D. Mayers, Eur. Phys.
J. D 41, 599 (2007).
[8] V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A
74, 022313 (2006), ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
[9] A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer, Opt. Express 15,
9388 (2007).
[10] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo,
Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 (2008).
[11] F. Xu, B. Qi, and H.-K. Lo, New J. Phys. 12, 113026
(2010).
[12] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010).
[13] L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar,
C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, Phys. Rev.
A 84, 032320 (2011).
[14] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurt-
siefer, and V. Makarov, Nat. Commun. 2, 349 (2011).
[15] H.-W. Li, S. Wang, J.-Z. Huang, W. Chen, Z.-Q. Yin,
F.-Y. Li, Z. Zhou, D. Liu, Y. Zhang, G.-C. Guo, W.-S.
Bao, and Z.-F. Han, Phys. Rev. A 84, 062308 (2011).
[16] H. Weier, H. Krauss, M. Rau, M. Fu¨rst, S. Nauerth, and
H. Weinfurter, New J. Phys. 13, 073024 (2011).
[17] N. Jain, C. Wittmann, L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers,
D. Elser, C. Marquardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 110501 (2011).
[18] S.-H. Sun, M.-S. Jiang, and L.-M. Liang, Phys. Rev. A
83, 062331 (2011).
[19] M.-S. Jiang, S.-H. Sun, C.-Y. Li, and L.-M. Liang, Phys.
8Rev. A 86, 032310 (2012).
[20] N. Jain, E. Anisimova, I. Khan, V. Makarov, C. Mar-
quardt, and G. Leuchs, New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014).
[21] S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jen-
newein, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and V. Makarov, Phys. Rev.
A 91, 062301 (2015).
[22] L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar,
and V. Makarov, New J. Phys. 13, 113042 (2011).
[23] M. G. Tanner, V. Makarov, and R. H. Hadfield, Opt.
Express 22, 6734 (2014).
[24] C. Kurtsiefer, P. Zarda, S. Mayer, and H. Weinfurter, J.
Mod. Opt. 48, 2039 (2001).
[25] A. Meda, I. P. Degiovanni, A. Tosi, Z. L. Yuan, G. Brida,
and M. Genovese, Light Sci. Appl. 6, e16261 (2017), ac-
cepted article preview.
[26] C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma,
Quantum Inf. Comput. 9, 131 (2009).
[27] L. Lydersen and J. Skaar, Quantum Inf. Comput. 10,
0060 (2010).
[28] M. Tomamichel, C. C. W. Lim, N. Gisin, and R. Renner,
Nat. Commun. 3, 634 (2012).
[29] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,
130503 (2012).
[30] A. Rubenok, J. A. Slater, P. Chan, I. Lucio-Martinez,
and W. Tittel, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 130501 (2013).
[31] H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, Z.-W. Yu, H. Liu, L.-X. You,
Y.-H. Zhou, S.-J. Chen, Y. Mao, M.-Q. Huang, W.-J.
Zhang, H. Chen, M. J. Li, D. Nolan, F. Zhou, X. Jiang,
Z. Wang, Q. Zhang, X.-B. Wang, and J.-W. Pan, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 117, 190501 (2016).
[32] Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, Nat. Pho-
tonics 4, 800 (2010).
[33] Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys.
Lett. 98, 231104 (2011).
[34] C. C. W. Lim, N. Walenta, M. Legre´, N. Gisin, and
H. Zbinden, IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron. 21,
6601305 (2015).
[35] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, Nat. Photonics 4, 801 (2010).
[36] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser,
J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, Appl. Phys. Lett. 99, 196101
(2010).
[37] A. Huang, S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, M. Soucarros,
M. Legre´, and V. Makarov, IEEE J. Quant. Electron.
52, 1 (2016).
[38] Ø. Marøy, L. Lydersen, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A 82,
032337 (2010).
[39] L. Lydersen, V. Makarov, and J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A
83, 032306 (2011).
[40] S. Pironio, A. Acin, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, and
V. Scarani, New Journal of Physics 11, 045021 (2009).
[41] W. Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[42] H.-K. Lo, X. F. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
230504 (2005).
[43] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[44] P. Townsend, J. Rarity, and P. Tapster, Electron. Lett.
29, 634 (1993).
[45] W. T. Buttler, R. J. Hughes, P. G. Kwiat, S. K. Lamore-
aux, G. G. Luther, G. L. Morgan, J. E. Nordholt, C. G.
Peterson, and C. M. Simmons, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3283
(1998).
[46] This symmetrization simplifies the analysis of the secret
rate. In the case of a difference between yields, qz and qx,
or error rates, δz and δx, between the bases of the unsym-
metrized protocol, the symmetrization leads to a lower
rate. However such differences will generally be small,
and the impact on the secret rate insignificant.
[47] η¯ could also have been defined as the average value of η
over all incoming signals. This would change Eqs. (3)–(7)
and Eq. (11), but the main result Eq. (12) would be the
same.
[48] A. N. Bugge, S. Sauge, A. M. M. Ghazali, J. Skaar, L. Ly-
dersen, and V. Makarov, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 070503
(2014).
[49] V. Makarov, J.-P. Bourgoin, P. Chaiwongkhot,
M. Gagne´, T. Jennewein, S. Kaiser, R. Kashyap,
M. Legre´, C. Minshull, and S. Sajeed, Phys. Rev. A 94,
030302 (2016).
[50] Another interesting idea is to use frequency dependent
phase modulation. Then frequencies different from ω0 are
detected by an increased error rate.
[51] Frequencies inside Ω will also be attenuated by this fil-
ter. However, since this loss is basis-independent we can
attribute it to Eve and it doesn’t contribute to η.
[52] S. Cova, M. Ghioni, A. Lotito, I. Rech, and F. Zappa,
J. Mod. Opt. 51, 1267 (2004).
[53] R. H. Hadfield, Nat. Photonics 3, 696 (2009).
[54] M. D. Eisaman, J. Fan, A. Migdall, and S. V. Polyakov,
Rev. Sci. Instrum. 82, 071101 (2011).
[55] A. Beveratos, R. Brouri, T. Gacoin, A. Villing, J.-P.
Poizat, and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187901
(2002).
[56] R. Alle´aume, F. Treussart, G. Messin, Y. Dumeige, J.-F.
Roch, A. Beveratos, R. Brouri-Tualle, J.-P. Poizat, and
P. Grangier, New J. Phys. 6, 92 (2004).
[57] D. Stucki, N. Gisin, O. Guinnard, G. Ribordy, and
H. Zbinden, New J. Phys. 4, 41 (2002).
[58] M. Lucamarini, I. Choi, M. B. Ward, J. F. Dynes,
Z. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Phys. Rev. X 5, 031030
(2015).
[59] K. Tamaki, M. Curty, and M. Lucamarini, New J. Phys.
18, 065008 (2016).
